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Abstract 
The volunteer’s dilemma is a social dilemma in which one of the players has to volunteer 
in order to produce the public good for the group. It is important to find out what drives 
people to cooperate in such volunteer’s dilemmas, since it is negative for all participants 
when no one cooperates. Based on previous research, we expected that valence framing 
would influence the choice in the volunteer’s dilemma. Based on prospect theory, it was 
hypothesized that the participants in a loss frame would defect more often than 
participants in a gain frame. The second factor we researched was the influence of 
maximization score on the probability to cooperate. We expected that maximizers would 
be more likely to defect. Results showed that valence framing did influence the 
probability of cooperating, but, perhaps due to the use of small monetary amounts as 
rewards, in the opposite way than expected. Maximization score was no significant 
predictor of the probability of cooperating. 
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Why the maximizer will not volunteer: 
The influence of frames on maximizers and satisficers 
People who have lived with roommates will recognize the problem: Someone 
needs to take the trash out, but nobody wants to do it. The trash in the can will pile up, 
until someone finally yields and volunteers. In the end, everybody benefits from the task 
done: The house is cleaner and less smelly. However, only the volunteer does the work 
and pays the costs needed to gain value for all roommates. This common problem is an 
example of the volunteer’s dilemma. In this dilemma, you get the maximum individual 
payoff value when someone else does the effort, and you just benefit from the result. The 
somewhat less positive outcome is when you take out the trash. You have to do the effort, 
but also benefit from the result of having a clean house. The least favorable option is 
when no one does the effort, in that case no one reaches the desired result, and everyone 
has to live in the smell. The example of the trash is an example with minor consequences, 
but the volunteer’s dilemma can also be a matter of life or death in case of emergency, 
since it is connected to the diffusion of responsibility (Darley, & Latané, 1968). For 
example, when a small child falls into the pool and someone has to jump in and save him. 
The effort of jumping in the water is relatively small to save a child’s life, but if no one 
does it, the child will not survive. So who will be the first one to jump in?  
In volunteer’s dilemmas, the least favorable option is when no one does the effort. 
This is something that needs to be avoided. If we know which factors influence the chance 
that someone volunteers, we could use this to make sure that the least favorable option does 
not happen often, by addressing people in the best way. There has been some research on 
the volunteer’s dilemma from a game-theoretic perspective (e.g. Diekman, 1985; Goeree, 
Holt & Smith, 2017), which explained a lot about the payoff structure of the volunteer’s 
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dilemma and its outcomes, but did not take psychological factors into account. The present 
research will fill this informational gap in the literature by focusing on individual factors 
that influence the likelihood that someone cooperates in the volunteer’s dilemma. To do 
this, we will first explain the overlap and distinctions between the volunteer’s dilemma and 
other social dilemmas. Subsequently, we will give a short overview about the influence of 
valence frames on social decision making and we will highlight the importance of valence 
of the volunteer’s dilemma. Finally, we will explain why we expect that the degree of 
maximization can influence one’s choice in the volunteer’s dilemma.   
 
Defining social dilemmas 
The volunteer’s dilemma is a specific type of social dilemma. Social dilemmas are 
situations in which personal interest conflicts with the public interest (Messick et al., 
1983). The pay-off schedule of the volunteer’s dilemma can be seen in Table 1. In this 
dilemma, the best outcome for every individual is free-riding (i.e. defecting while 
someone else volunteers) while the best outcome for the group is that someone gives up 
his or her individual interest and provides the public good (Poundstone, 1992). The 
options of a person in a volunteer’s dilemma can be described as follows. The person can 
choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The lowest individual score is reached when  
 
Table 1. The individual participant payoff schedule in a volunteer’s dilemma 
  Other group members 
  At least one player cooperates No one cooperates 
You Cooperate 2 3 
 Defect 4 1 
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everybody defects. In this case, all players will lose (1). If one person cooperates, and the 
rest defects, that person has to pay the price and has the sucker payoff (3), which can be 
defined as the maximum payoff minus the invested effort. If another person cooperates, 
but you defect, you reach the maximum score because you can free-ride on the effort of 
the volunteer (4). It is also possible that multiple players cooperate (2). In this case, the 
public good is realized, but multiple players pay the price, which makes it less preferable 
for the group than just one player volunteering.  
 This pay-off schedule is almost the same in the chicken game, which is often 
illustrated by the film ‘Rebel without a cause’ from 1955 (Poundstone, 1992). The 
difference is that the chicken game is played by two players. The pay-off schedule of the 
chicken game can be seen in Table 2. In the movie, two boys drive their car towards a 
cliff and try to jump out at the last moment. The boy who jumps out first is the so-called 
chicken, and the other boy wins. If they both keep driving, however, they will both drive 
off the cliff and die. Another version of the chicken game is the highway chicken. In this 
edition, two cars drive towards each other at high speed. The player who keeps driving 
straight the longest while the other player swerves, is the winner because he does not 
contribute to the public good of surviving (4) but receives the benefits from it, and the 
other player is the chicken and provides the public good of surviving (3). If both players 
swerve at the same time (2), they are both chickens, but this is still better than dying. If 
they both continue driving, they will both die, which is the least favorable option (1). 
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Table 2. The individual participant payoff schedule in a chicken game 
  Other player 
  Cooperates Defects 
You Cooperate 2 3 
 Defect 4 1 
 
When comparing the pay-off schedules in Table 1 and Table 2, one can conclude that the 
volunteer’s dilemma is a multi-player (N-player) chicken game (Poundstone, 1992). The 
previous part demonstrated that there is substantial overlap between the chicken game 
and the volunteer’s dilemma, because they have a comparable outcome-matrix. These 
outcomes can be described as gains or as losses. The following part will elaborate on 
what previous research found on how framing the outcomes as gains versus losses 
influences decision making, to explain why it could also be relevant for the volunteer’s 
dilemma.  
 
Decisions and frames 
Many economic decision theories are based on the assumption that human beings are 
rational, and that people have stable preferences over time and situations (e.g. Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). This would mean that decision makers would respond 
similarly to different descriptions of an objectively equivalent problem (Levin, Schneider, 
& Gaeth, 1998). For the decision maker, it should not matter how the problem is 
described, as long as the underlying payoff structure is the same. In contrast to these 
economic decision theories, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that people’s decisions 
 8 
depend on the valence of the problem presented to them. Just as a flat square might look 
like a line from a sideways perspective, one outcome can be framed from multiple 
perspectives and thus be perceived differently. The frame that a decision-maker uses, can 
be changed by the formulation of the problem. If this also applies to the volunteer’s 
dilemma, this would mean that a change in the description of the volunteer’s dilemma 
could increase the probability that someone cooperates. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
have demonstrated the effect of valence framing with the nowadays famous Asian disease 
problem. In this problem, participants heard that an Asian disease was spreading. The 
disease was expected to kill 600 people, and they had to decide which of the two cure 
programs would be activated. The participants were divided in two conditions. The 
participants in the positive condition had to choose between curing 200 people for sure, 
or a one-third chance at saving 600, with a two-thirds chance of saving no one. The 
participants in the negative condition had to choose between the first option which was an 
assured death of 400 people, or the second option which was a one-third chance of losing 
no lives and a two-third chance of losing all 600 people. The options of the Asian disease 
problem can also be seen in Table 3. For both conditions, option A offered certainty, and 
option B offered a risky choice because it involved chances at outcomes rather than 
certain outcomes. Both options were objectively equivalent, since they saved the same 
number of people with the same odds. The only difference between the options was the 
reference point.  
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Table 3. The options of the Asian Disease problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 1981) 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found that the majority of participants in the positive 
condition chose the certain outcome, whereas the majority in the negative condition chose 
for the risky option. This research shows that people are risk-avoidant in the positive 
domain, but risk-seeking in the negative domain. People prefer sure gains, and risky losses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1983) described this phenomenon in their Prospect Theory. This 
research also shows that a change in reference point (gain lives or lose lives), can change 
the decision made by the participant. This change in preference due to valence frames is 
called ‘choice reversal’.  
 
Framing the volunteer 
Changing the valence of the volunteer’s dilemma is not hard to do, and might have a big 
influence on the decision of the people. The choice reversal that is caused by a change in 
the valence frame could be used to increase the probability that someone cooperates in the 
volunteer’s dilemma, since options of the volunteer’s dilemma differ in riskiness. For 
instance, when choosing to defect, you can end up with the highest outcome (free-wheeling 
on the effort of someone else) or the lowest outcome, when no-one decides to cooperate. 
This makes it a risky choice. When choosing to cooperate, you can make the public good 
 Positive frame Negative frame  
Option A 100% chance at saving 200 100% chance that 400 will die Certain 
Option B 33% chance at saving all 600 
67% chance at saving none 
33% chance that nobody will die 
67% that all 600 die 
Risky 
 10 
available for the whole group, but if multiple people volunteer, you could have a higher 
outcome when you would not have volunteered. The option to defect is more hazardous 
than the option to cooperate, because the option to defect could also lead to the outcome of 
not realizing the public good, which is the least beneficial outcome for the individual and 
the group. The option to defect thus has the highest variation in outcomes. When 
cooperating, you will not get the highest outcome, but at least the public good is realized 
and there will be some payoff. Therefore, in the volunteer’s dilemma, the option to defect 
contains more risk than the option to cooperate. This makes it probable that there will also 
be a choice reversal in the volunteer’s dilemma, when the valence frame of the dilemma 
differs.  For example: When the volunteer’s dilemma is about gains, all players can receive 
a reward, but in order to give most people a large reward, someone has to settle for the 
smaller reward. In this case, people will be more likely to cooperate, since this is the less 
risky option. When the volunteer’s dilemma is about losses, all players have an amount of 
money, and if they want to keep it, someone has to pay for the group. In this case, people 
will be more likely to defect, since this is the risky option. Therefore, we could expect that 
there is more defection (risky option) in the loss frame than in the gain frame within the 
volunteer’s dilemma.  
The second reason we hypothesize that valence frames will influence the decision 
in the volunteer’s dilemma, is that previous research demonstrated that valence frames can 
lead to choice reversal in the chicken game (De Heus, Hoogervorst and Van Dijk, 2010). 
According to De Heus et al. (2010), valence framing will influence choice in the social 
dilemma, if the participants can choose between a relative risky option and a relative safe 
option, which is the case in the volunteer’s dilemma. This leads to Hypothesis 1.  
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H1: Participants in a loss frame will volunteer less often than participants in a gain  
frame.  
 
Differentiating maximizers and satisficers 
As stated before, we expect that frames influence decision making in a volunteer’s 
dilemma. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) stated that the frame a decision maker uses is 
partially controlled by personal characteristics of the decision maker. Schwarz et al. (2002) 
found that people differ in the desire to maximize their outcomes and that people have 
different goals for decision making. Maximizers always strive for the best possible 
outcome. They look through all the options and compare them thoroughly. Maximizers are 
not able to lower their threshold for acceptability. They only want the best outcome. 
Satisficers, on the other hand, determine one threshold for acceptability. If the outcome is 
above the threshold, the satisficer will be satisfied. A maximizer that receives the same 
outcome as a satisficer might be very unhappy, because the maximizer will compare it to 
the maximum possible outcome (Schwarz et al., 2002). Maximizers are also more likely to 
engage in social comparison, and are more sensitive to social comparison information than 
satisficers are (Schwarz et al. 2002).  The concept that maximizers tend to use more social 
comparison, might lead them to defect more often than satisficers. Cooperating in a 
volunteer’s dilemma will always lead to outcomes that are lower than or equal to the 
outcomes of the other group members, as can be seen in Figure 1. If maximizers indeed 
use the outcomes of their fellow group members as reference point for comparison 
(Hypothesis 2), it is likely that they will not volunteer. Maximizers will socially compare 
themselves to their group members, and see that volunteering could not bring them the 
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maximum outcome. People with lower maximization scores, on the other hand, might 
choose to cooperate more often. Cooperating still results in gains, and if this gain is above 
their threshold of acceptability, they will not risk receiving nothing because they are 
already satisfied. Therefore, we expected that people who maximize more are less likely to 
volunteer. This leads to hypothesis 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 1. Systematic view of the influence of social comparison on the evaluation of the different 
outcomes of the volunteer’s dilemma.  
 
H2: People with higher maximization score compare their outcomes more often with group  
members. 
H3: In both frames, there is a negative relationship between maximization score and the 
probability that someone will volunteer.  
 
Method 
To test our hypotheses, we did an online experiment with two conditions (gain frame 
versus loss frame) in a between-subject design. The participants were randomly assigned 
to the two conditions by Qualtrics, a survey design program. The dependent variable was 
 13 
their choice in the volunteer’s dilemma (defect or cooperate). The independent variables 
were the maximizing scores as measured by the questionnaire of Dalal, Diab, Zhu & 
Hwang (2015) and the condition (gain or loss frame).  
 
Participants 
108 Individuals participated in the experiment. The participants were Dutch speaking. 
The experiment was tested with an online questionnaire. Participants were contacted via 
social media and in the social science faculty in Leiden, The Netherlands.  
We are aware that there are some difficulties with using an online survey. One of 
these difficulties is that participants might be less engaged to fill in the survey, and just 
‘want to get it over with’. Therefore, we excluded participants that did not take the survey 
seriously using two criteria: The duration of the survey was measured, and we excluded 
participants who took less than three minutes to fill in the survey. Considering the 
amount of text in the experiment, it is not possible to read everything in a period shorter 
than three minutes. We also excluded participants that answered both comprehension 
questions incorrectly, because we do not think they fully understood the consequences of 
their answers, or did not take enough time to read the description. The excluded 
participants were paid normally. After excluding 10 participants on the earlier named 
criteria, the sample consisted out of 98 participants (N = 98), of which 59 (60.2%) were 
female and 39 (39.8%) were male. The mean age was 24.1 years (SD = 7.41) with a 
minimum age of 18 and a maximum age of 62 years old.  
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Procedure 
The participants joined the experiment via a weblink. The link led them to a Qualtrics 
survey. The participants read an informed consent text, that stated that they could stop the 
experiment at any moment, and that their answers were recorded anonymously and 
confidentially. The participant first answered some questions about demographics. 
Subsequently, the participant filled in the MTS-7 (Dalal, Diab, Zhu & Hwang, 2015) to 
measure maximization tendencies. A filler block with three ‘find the difference’ pictures 
was included, to weaken the association between the answers filled in at the 
maximization test and the decision in the volunteer’s dilemma. Qualtrics randomly 
assigned the participants to the gain or the loss frame condition. Then the volunteer’s 
dilemma part started. First, the participant read the instructions as shown in Appendix A1 
(gain frame) and Appendix A2 (loss frame). The participant answered two questions to 
test whether he/she understood the instructions of the volunteer’s dilemma. Second, the 
participant answered if he/she cooperated or defected in the volunteer’s dilemma. Third, 
the participant answered a question to check whether the manipulation of framing worked 
and another one to check which information they used as reference point to make their 
decision. In the reference point question, the participants had to answer whether they took 
the outcomes of their fellow group members as a reference point, or the minimum 
amount that could be earned. The participant filled in the necessary information for 
payment. In the end, the participant was thanked for participation and told that for any 
questions or comments, they could contact us at a given email address.  
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The valence manipulation 
To manipulate the valence of the volunteer’s dilemma, the dilemma was framed as a gain 
or as a loss situation. After exclusion, 48 subjects participated in the volunteer’s dilemma 
with a gain frame (49%) and 50 subjects in the loss frame (51%). The pay-off schedule 
for both frames is shown in Table 1. Each participant received €1,50 as a compensation 
for their time. In the gain frame, the participants read that they could earn a €2,50 bonus 
on top of the original €1,50. To realize this, however, one participant had to settle for a 
lower bonus of €1,-. When no one settled for the lower bonus, none of the participants 
would receive any extra money.  
In the loss frame, the participants started off with €4,-. To receive this amount of 
money, one of the participants had to pay €1,50. That player would get €2,50 instead of 
€4,-. When no one payed the cost, all players received €1,50 instead of the €4,- they had 
in the beginning.  
 Both problems were stated in Dutch, since we expected that all of our respondents 
understood Dutch. The translated edition of the questions and answers (different for gain 
and loss frame) can be found in Appendices A1 and A2.  
 
Table 1. The individual participant payoff schedule for both frames 
  Other group members 
  At least one player cooperates No one cooperates 
You Cooperate €2,50 €2,50 
 Defect €4,00 €1,50 
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Measuring maximization 
There are many different scales to measure maximization. The two most commonly used 
scales are the Maximization Scale and the Maximizing Tendency Scale. Dalal, Diab, Zhu 
& Hwang (2015) found that the Maximizing Tendency Scale is more valid (both 
psychometrical and theoretical) than the Maximization Scale. For this experiment, the 
Maximizing Tendency Scale was used. The MTS-7 consists of 7 items that should be 
answered on a 7 point Likert-scale. The MTS-7 can be found in Appendix B. The MTS-7 
was translated into Dutch. During the pre-test we found that item number 5 (“I am a 
maximizer”) raised a lot of questions. Our pre-test participants explained that they did not 
know the concept ‘maximizer’. Therefore, the question was changed to ‘I always strive 
for the best outcome’.  The MTS-7 had a good internal consistency (a = .843). 
 
Results 
Valence framing in the volunteer’s dilemma 
The first hypothesis stated that participants in a loss frame were more likely to defect 
than participants in a gain frame. Both the variable ‘frame’ (gain vs. loss) and ‘choice’ 
(cooperate vs. defect) are dichotomous variables. We first examined if the participants 
perceived the smaller amount of money as a gain or as a loss by performing a Chi-square 
test on the condition (dichotomous: gain or loss frame) and perception (dichotomous: 
perceived as gain or perceived as loss). The Chi-square test tested whether the 
distribution of outcomes is due to chance or due to the manipulation. Subsequently, we 
performed a Chi-square test on the condition (dichotomous: gain or loss frame) and their 
choice (dichotomous: cooperate or defect) in the volunteer’s dilemma.  
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Manipulation check. The assumptions were checked to see whether performing a 
Chi-square would be appropriate: The two variables are on dichotomous measurement 
level (gain versus loss frame perceived as loss versus perceived as gain) and they 
consisted out of two categorical, independent groups. Therefore, performing a Chi-square 
was appropriate. The results of the Chi-square test on the perceived gain or loss and the 
gain or loss condition were not significant (c2(1) = .469, p = .481), which means that the 
participants in a gain frame did not significantly perceive the small amount of money as a 
gain more often than the participants in a loss frame. Only 36.7% of the participants in a 
loss frame experienced the smaller amount of money as a loss. In the gain frame, only 
56.3% of the participants experienced the smaller amount of money as a gain. This might 
be problematic for our further analysis. We will elaborate on the consequences of this 
outcome on further analyses in the discussion section.  
Valence frames. To test whether participants in a loss frame were less likely to 
cooperate than participants in a gain frame, a Chi-square test was performed on the 
condition (gain or loss) and the choice of the participant (cooperate or defect). The Chi-
square test was marginally significant (c2(1) = 3.342, p = .068), which means that the 
choices of participants in a gain frame were significantly different from the choices of 
participants in a loss frame. Remarkably, the results showed that the effect of the 
manipulation was opposite to what the hypothesis predicted: In the gain frame, 39.6% of 
the participants cooperated. In the loss frame, 58.0% of the participants cooperated. A 
visual display of the results can be seen in Figure 2. These results mean that participants 
in a loss frame were more likely to cooperate, and participants in a gain frame were more 
likely to defect. This contradicts our theoretical framework and previous research.  
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Figure 2. A bar chart showing the choices of participants in the gain frame and the loss 
frame.  
 
The influence of maximization score on cooperation  
The second part of the research examined the influence of maximization score on the 
choice in the volunteer’s dilemma. The theoretical substantiation of this hypothesis is that 
maximizers were more likely to compare their outcomes to the outcomes of the other 
players (Hypothesis 2). This was tested with a logistic regression with MTS-score as 
independent variable and reference point as a dichotomous variable.  
Subsequently, to test whether MTS-score influences the likelihood that someone 
cooperates (Hypothesis 3), another logistic regression was performed. In this model the 
dependent variable is choice (cooperate or defect) on dichotomous measurement level 
and the independent variable is MTS-score, measured on interval level.  
 Social comparison. The first logistic regression tested whether participants with 
higher maximization scores were more likely to compare their outcomes to their group 
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members instead of the total amount of money. Beforehand, the assumptions were 
checked: The dependent variable (reference point) is dichotomous and the options are 
mutually exclusive because participants said they compared their answers to their group 
members or to the maximum amount of money. The independent variable (MTS-score) is 
measured on interval level. The observations are independent because we assume that 
participants did not discuss their answers. The final assumption was linearity of the 
independent variable. To see whether this was the case, a Box Tidwell test was performed 
with the interaction between the MTS-score and the natural log of the MTS-score 
included in the logistic regression. This interaction was not significant (p = .104) which 
means we can assume linearity. The regression model was not significant (c2(1) = .300, p 
= .583), which means that the MTS-score was not a significant predictor of the 
participant’s reference point.  
 Maximization score. The second logistic regression tested whether participants 
with higher maximization scores were less likely to volunteer than participants with the 
lower maximization scores. Beforehand, the assumptions were checked: The dependent 
variable (choice) is dichotomous and the options are mutually exclusive because 
participants had to choose between cooperating or defecting. The independent variable 
(MTS-score) is measured on interval level. The observations are independent because we 
assume that participants did not discuss their answers. The final assumption was linearity 
of the independent variable. To see whether this was the case, a Box Tidwell test was 
performed with the interaction between the MTS-score and the natural log of the MTS-
score included in the logistic regression. This interaction was not significant (p = .216) 
which means we can assume linearity.  The final regression model was not significant 
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(c2(1) = .233, p = .629), which means that the MTS-score is not a significant predictor of 
the probability that someone cooperates.  
Discussion  
The present study was about how valence frame and maximization score influence the 
probability of cooperation in a volunteer’s dilemma. The results of the experiment did not 
match the hypotheses but, nevertheless, there are interesting findings which we will 
discuss in the following part. First, the current method and results on valence framing are 
compared to the method and results of De Heus et al. (2010) to see where the differences 
are that can explain why valence framing influences the chicken game in their experiment 
significantly, but the volunteer’s dilemma in our experiment only marginally significant, 
and opposite to what we expected. Subsequently, we will discuss the influence of 
maximization score on the probability of cooperation. To conclude, we will discuss 
implications and directions for further research.  
 
Valence frames  
The first hypothesis was that participants would be more likely to cooperate in a gain 
frame, than in a loss frame. The statistical results showed that the choice of the 
participants in the gain frame indeed differed from the choice of the participants in the 
loss frame, but in opposite direction than expected: Participants in a gain frame were less 
likely to cooperate than participants in a loss frame. This contrasts with the findings of 
De Heus et al. (2010), who found that in a chicken game, participants were more likely to 
cooperate in a gain frame than in a loss frame. The payoff structure of the chicken game 
is approximately equal to the structure of a volunteer’s dilemma, which made it 
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reasonably that valence framing would have the same effect in both dilemmas. However, 
this was not the case. There are several reasons why the present experiment might have 
had different results than the research of De Heus et al. (2010).  
 The first reason is the difference in number of players. De Heus et al. (2010) 
examined the influence of valence framing in a two-player chicken game, whereas the 
volunteer’s dilemma in this research is conducted with four players. The number of group 
members could make a difference in the probability of cooperating, since Archetti (2009) 
found that the larger the group, the smaller the probability that someone volunteers and, 
even though there are more possible volunteer’s, the smaller the chance that the public 
good is realized. However, this should happen in both conditions (gain and loss frame) of 
the present experiment and should not reduce the influence of the valence frame on the 
probability to cooperate in only one of the frames.  
 The second explanation why current results might differ from previous research, 
is the payoff structure. In our experiment, participants knew they would receive at least 
€1,50, regardless of their choices and the choices of other players. In the experiment of 
De Heus et al. (2010), participants could win 0, 1, 2 or 3 tickets to a lottery game. It is 
possible that the chance to win nothing influences the way the participants evaluate the 
risk. This could be explained by curvilinear shape of the earlier named prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). The steepness of the value function declines as the 
objective value increases. This means that the participant experiences a bigger change in 
subjective value between 0 and 1, than between 1 and 2. It is possible that the absence of 
gaining nothing (or losing it all) influenced the risk judgement of the participants. This 
difference subjective value is displayed in Figure 3. The figure shows that the difference 
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subjective value between the possible outcomes is bigger in the research design of De 
Heus et al. (2010). The expectation was that the participants would be risk-seeking in the 
negative domain, and risk-aversive in the positive domain, with defecting as risky option. 
The risky option is defecting, because it has the biggest variance in outcomes. However, 
in our research there seems to be less variance in outcomes when it comes to the 
subjective value. This makes defecting less risky. De Heus et al. (2010) concluded that 
valence framing influences the outcomes in a chicken game, because the options 
(cooperating and defecting) differ in riskiness. The difference in outcomes between the 
experiments could mean that the riskiness of the options is not only depending on the 
objective value, but also on the subjective value of the risk. From these outcomes, we 
could speculate that the bigger the difference in riskiness between the options, the larger 
the influence of valence framing, but more research is necessary.  
 
Figure 3. The difference in subjective value between the possible outcomes of the 
experiment of De Heus et al. (2010) and the current research.  
 
This difference in subjective value could explain a reduction in influence of the 
valence frame on the probability to cooperate in the volunteer’s dilemma, but it does not 
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yet explain why the experiment had marginally significant results contradicting the 
hypothesis. To explain this, more information is needed on the characteristics on how 
people deal with small amounts of money, since the present experiment used small 
amounts of money, whereas De Heus et al. (2010) used lottery tickets. Harinck, Van 
Dijk, Van Beest and Mersmann (2007) found that for small amounts of money, gains 
loom larger than losses. This happens because of two reasons. The first reason is the 
hedonic principle: people can make small negative outcomes appear unimportant by 
telling themselves that the negative outcome will not hurt them badly. The second reason 
is that people experience a lot of small losses and, thus, learned that they can overcome 
small losses. These effects make people diminish the importance of small negative 
outcomes, and this makes small positive outcomes seem relatively more important. 
People are less loss aversive when it comes to small amounts of money. This results in a 
different-looking value function, which can be seen in Figure 4. The adjusted value 
function is concave for small amounts and convex for larger amounts in the negative 
domain.  
 
Figure 4. The relationship between subjective value and objected value, adapted for the 
findings about small amounts of money by Harinck et al. (2007). 
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When connecting these findings to our research, it is possible that the participants 
in the loss condition diminish the subjective value of the small loss. Figure 4 shows that 
in the loss frame, the subjective value difference between losing 0, 1,50 or 2,50 is 
relatively smaller than the objectively equivalent difference in the gain frame. 
Participants are not willing to take a risk (defect) for a chance at avoiding a small loss, 
because they know they can diminish the importance of a small loss. Since the gains 
loom larger, the subjective value difference between the options is bigger in the positive 
domain than in the negative domain, and people are more willing to take a risk in the 
positive domain, relatively to the negative domain. These insights could explain the high 
proportion of cooperation in the negative domain, but do not fully explain why the 
participants in the gain frame defected more than expected. To confirm this explanation, 
and to find out how people deal with small gains, more research is necessary. We can 
conclude that valence framing does have influence in the volunteer’s dilemma, but, when 
played with small monetary rewards, participants in a loss frame will cooperate more 
often than participants in a gain frame. This conclusion is an addition to the previous 
research of De Heus et al. (2010) and seems to be in line with the findings of Harinck et 
al. (2007).  
Manipulation check. The results showed that the manipulation check was not 
significant. The manipulation check question was whether they would experience the 
smaller amount (2,50) as a gain or as a loss. The Chi-square test showed that the 
participants in a gain frame did not differ significantly from the participants in a loss 
frame in their answer on this question. This might be because there was something wrong 
with the manipulation, but we also expect that social desirability of answers has an 
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influence here, because in both conditions, the majority of the participants said it felt as a 
gain. The social desirable answer is saying it feels as a gain, because you receive money. 
It could be seen as ungrateful when saying it feels as a loss. This is a limitation to this 
research, because we cannot determine whether the manipulation check is insignificant 
due to social desirability or a not-working manipulation.  
 
Maximization score  
The second and third hypotheses of this research were related. The second hypothesis 
was that people with higher maximization scores were more likely to compare their 
outcomes to the other team members, than to the minimal amount of money. This was not 
confirmed by results of the data analysis. The third hypothesis was that people with 
higher maximization scores would be more likely to defect, because they compared their 
outcome to the outcome of their group members, and cooperation cannot give positive 
outcomes when socially compared, as can be seen in Figure 1. Results showed that 
maximization score was not a significant predictor of the probability that someone 
cooperates. This could mean that maximization score has no influence on how people 
make decisions in the volunteer’s dilemma. This seems contradictory, because the scale 
developed by Dalal et al. (2015) is measuring maximization as having high standards, 
and being unable to lower the standard. The highest outcome in our outcome is very 
clear: One could receive 4 euro. Therefore, people with higher maximization score would 
want that outcome, and only defecting can lead to the highest outcome, also when using 
social comparison to evaluate the outcomes. However, it might be that other factors 
influence this decision. The cooperate and defect options differ in amount of money and 
 26 
in riskiness. It is possible that the difference in risk might have an influence as well. Lai 
(2010) found that maximizers are more risk aversive than satisficers. The risk-aversive 
option is cooperating. Maximization might lead to a higher tendency to defect, while risk 
aversion (that often comes with maximization) might lead to a higher tendency to 
cooperate. This way, the influence of maximizer score might be neutralized by the 
influence of risk-aversion. This might explain why maximization score is not a 
significant predictor of defection in our research. To conclude that a higher maximization 
tendency influences the probability to defect, future research should control for risk-
aversion.  
 
Future research 
There are a few interesting questions that arise from our research. The first 
recommendation for further research is testing the influence of valence frame on the 
probability to cooperate in a volunteer’s dilemma with lottery tickets as reward, just as 
De Heus et al. (2010) did, to rule out that the effect of valence frame on the probability to 
cooperate is determined by the number of players. We would also recommend to avoid 
using small monetary amounts in all further social dilemma research, because people 
treat small monetary amounts different than larger gains and losses (Harinck et al., 2007), 
and since social dilemmas in the real world are often not about small monetary amounts, 
this reduces external validity.  
 Another question that arises from our research is the applicability of the prospect 
theory in the Volunteer’s dilemma. The prospect theory is valid when it comes to 
individual decision making, but the volunteer’s dilemma concerns a group decision, 
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which might change how people experience the options. The prospect theory describes 
the relationship between objective and subjective value in individual situations. In group 
decision making, people might not only consider their own outcomes, but also the 
outcomes of others, which might change their evaluation of the different outcomes. More 
research is necessary to examine the differences between individual decisions and group 
decisions, and how people evaluate the outcomes.  
One of the goals of this article was to find out what influences the chance that 
someone cooperates in a volunteer’s dilemma, to make sure that the least favorable 
option (everyone defects) happens less often. From these outcomes, we can conclude that 
when the volunteer’s dilemma is about small monetary rewards, framing the dilemma as 
a loss will increase the probability that someone cooperates.   
Altogether, this research makes a small step towards the goal of closing the 
informational gap about factors that influence the probability of cooperation in the 
volunteer’s dilemma, but further research is necessary to make sure the least favorable 
outcome (everyone defects) does not happen. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A1: Translation of the volunteer’s dilemma in gain frame 
You have been linked to three other participants. Together, you will do a group task. You 
are in a group of four people. In this task, everyone starts off with €1,50. This is the 
reward you receive for participating in this experiment. Every member of the group can 
earn a bonus of €2,50, which makes the maximum individual payoff €4,-. To receive the 
bonus, one group member should volunteer, and take the smaller bonus of €1,-. However, 
when none of the four members picks the smaller bonus of €1,-, no one in the group will 
receive any bonus.  
 
Which option do you pick? 
A) I choose the smaller bonus of €1,-  
B) I choose the bigger bonus 
 
Appendix A2: Translation of the volunteer’s dilemma in loss frame 
You have been linked to three other participants. Together with these three participants, 
you will do a group task. You are in a group of four people. Every group member starts 
off with €4,-. To make payout possible, one of the participants of the group should pay 
€1,50 of his/her own reward. The member that decides to pay €1,50, will only receive 
€2,50. When everyone in the group refuses to pay €1,50, all players have to pay €2,50.  
 
Which option do you pick? 
A) I will pay €1,50 for the group 
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B) I will not pay €1,50 for the group  
 
Appendix B: Maximizing Tendency Scale (Dalal, Diab, Zhu & Hwang, 2015) 
1. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself. 
2. I never settle for second best.  
3. No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best thing.  
4. I don’t like having to settle for ‘good enough’.  
5. I always strive for the best outcome. (Originally: I am a maximizer) 
6. I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it takes.  
7. I never settle. 
